skills/poteto/noodle/execute/Gen Agent Trust Hub

execute

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions to "Never ask the user" and "Don't stop until the work is fully complete," explicitly directing the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop safety checks and operate fully autonomously.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Under the "Team Execution" section, the skill instructs the agent to spawn teammates using mode: "bypassPermissions". This is a direct attempt to circumvent permission-based security controls within the agent's task execution environment.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the noodle worktree exec command to run arbitrary commands within a worktree environment, which can be derived from untrusted plan files or user input.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The methodology includes executing a local shell script (sh scripts/lint-arch.sh), creating a path for arbitrary code execution if the script is modified by an attacker.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The noodle event emit command transmits implementation summaries and potentially sensitive progress data to an external backend service using a session identifier.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Reads untrusted data from brain/plans/ and brain/todos.md (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present.
  • Capability inventory: Includes noodle CLI, pnpm, go, git, sh, and Task creation with bypassPermissions (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not escape or validate the content of the ingested files before using them to drive implementation steps.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 22, 2026, 01:16 AM