composio-gmail
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell environment tools including
curlandjqto perform authenticated API requests to the Composio backend. Evidence of this behavior is found in the core execution patterns of bothSKILL.mdandreferences/actions.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its ability to read external data from a user's Gmail inbox.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves external data through the
GMAIL_LIST_MESSAGESandGMAIL_GET_MESSAGEactions defined inreferences/actions.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The implementation lacks markers (such as XML tags or clear boundaries) or explicit instructions to the agent to ignore commands that may be embedded in email bodies.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides sensitive capabilities including sending emails (
GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL), modifying message labels (GMAIL_MODIFY_MESSAGE), and deleting messages (GMAIL_DELETE_MESSAGE), which could be misused if the agent is manipulated by injected instructions. - Sanitization: Absent. The raw content of emails is retrieved from the Composio API and passed into the agent's context without filtering or validation.
Audit Metadata