baoyu-danger-gemini-web

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses child_process.spawn in scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.ts to launch browser executables (Chrome, Edge, or Chromium) found on the host system to facilitate authentication.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill extracts sensitive session cookies including __Secure-1PSID and __Secure-1PSIDTS from the automated browser and saves them in plain text JSON files within the user's application data directory (e.g., ~/.local/share/baoyu-skills/gemini-web/cookies.json).
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local files provided via command-line arguments and uploads their content to Google's content-push.googleapis.com endpoint during image generation and vision tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated or web-sourced images from Google's googleusercontent.com domains directly to the local filesystem using fetch in scripts/gemini-webapi/types/image.ts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates external data from local files into AI generation prompts, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Prompt content and reference images are read from the filesystem in scripts/main.ts via readFile.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are used when concatenating file content into the API request body in scripts/gemini-webapi/client.ts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permissions for network communication (Google APIs), broad file system access (reading prompts/images, writing cookies/sessions), and process execution (launching browsers).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external files before it is processed by the AI model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 01:05 AM