mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The file
scripts/connections.pyimplements theMCPConnectionStdioclass, which usesstdio_clientfrom themcplibrary to execute local processes based on acommandandargsprovided at runtime. - Evidence: The
create_connectionfactory function allows the agent to instantiate this class with arbitrary command strings, creating a vector for local command execution if the agent is influenced by malicious instructions. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The
SKILL.mdfile instructs the agent to fetch various external resources to 'study' the protocol. - Evidence: Instructions in Phase 1.2 and 1.3 direct the agent to fetch
https://modelcontextprotocol.io/sitemap.xmland README files fromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/modelcontextprotocol/. While these are legitimate documentation sources for the topic, fetching remote content into the prompt context always carries a minor risk. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill possesses a documented attack surface for indirect injection as it processes untrusted data from external URLs.
- Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdPhase 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 (fetching sitemaps, SDK READMEs, and API documentation). - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not specify using delimiters for the fetched content.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/connections.pyprovides the ability to execute local subprocesses (stdio) and perform network operations (http,sse). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not include steps to sanitize or filter the fetched documentation before it is read by the LLM.
Audit Metadata