mcp-builder

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The file scripts/connections.py implements the MCPConnectionStdio class, which uses stdio_client from the mcp library to execute local processes based on a command and args provided at runtime.
  • Evidence: The create_connection factory function allows the agent to instantiate this class with arbitrary command strings, creating a vector for local command execution if the agent is influenced by malicious instructions.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The SKILL.md file instructs the agent to fetch various external resources to 'study' the protocol.
  • Evidence: Instructions in Phase 1.2 and 1.3 direct the agent to fetch https://modelcontextprotocol.io/sitemap.xml and README files from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/modelcontextprotocol/. While these are legitimate documentation sources for the topic, fetching remote content into the prompt context always carries a minor risk.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill possesses a documented attack surface for indirect injection as it processes untrusted data from external URLs.
  • Evidence Chain:
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md Phase 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 (fetching sitemaps, SDK READMEs, and API documentation).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not specify using delimiters for the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: scripts/connections.py provides the ability to execute local subprocesses (stdio) and perform network operations (http, sse).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not include steps to sanitize or filter the fetched documentation before it is read by the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 05:23 PM