ccw-loop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill executes arbitrary commands retrieved from the
package.jsonfile of the workspace it is operating on. Specifically,action-validate-with-file.mdreads thetestandtest:coveragescripts and passes them directly toBash. This allows a malicious repository to execute arbitrary code on the host system. - Evidence: File
phases/actions/action-validate-with-file.mdextractspackageJson.scripts?.testand executes it viaBash({ command: testScript }). - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates unsanitized user-provided input (
task_description) and external content (source code files) directly into prompts sent to theccw cliand subagents. - Evidence: File
phases/actions/action-init.mdinterpolates${state.task_description}intoanalysisPrompt. Filephases/actions/action-develop-with-file.mddoes the same for implementation tasks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill possesses the capability to write files, execute shell commands, and invoke subagents based on the output of an LLM that is processing untrusted data (the task description and the source code). This chain of capabilities, combined with a lack of input validation, creates a significant RCE surface.
- Evidence: The orchestrator loop in
action-develop-with-file.mdusesccw clito generate implementation code which is then applied to the local filesystem.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata