copyright-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's core functionality involves ingesting and analyzing untrusted external data (the user's source code) while having access to sensitive tools including
Bash,Write, andTask. - Ingestion points: Source code files are identified and read during Phase 1.5 (
phases/01.5-project-exploration.md) and Phase 2 analysis. - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompts in
templates/agent-base.mdandphases/01.5-project-exploration.mddo not use delimiters or instructions to isolate the code being analyzed from the agent's logic, making it susceptible to instructions hidden in code comments. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute arbitrary shell commands via
Bashand create/modify files viaWrite. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from the source files before it is processed by the AI agents.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill explicitly uses the
Bashtool to execute system commands for project exploration and directory management. - Evidence:
phases/01.5-project-exploration.mdinstructs agents to runrg(ripgrep) and a project-specific toolccwto list modules and locate files.SKILL.mdusesBashto create the workspace directory structure. - Metadata Poisoning (LOW): While the skill uses metadata for document generation, most fields are populated via
AskUserQuestion(Phase 1), which involves direct user interaction, reducing the risk of automated poisoning unless the user themselves provides malicious input.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata