skills/qdbin/ai-skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In scripts/office/soffice.py, the skill performs runtime compilation of a C-based library and uses LD_PRELOAD to inject it into the soffice process. This shim intercepts system calls such as socket, listen, and accept to enable functionality in environments where AF_UNIX sockets are restricted.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local binaries including soffice for document manipulation and conversion, gcc for compiling the environment shim, pandoc for text extraction, and pdftoppm for rendering images.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted document data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through scripts/office/unpack.py during document extraction. Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using specific author markers (e.g., 'Claude') to delineate agent-generated content. Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (soffice.py, accept_changes.py) and extensive file system write access (pack.py). Sanitization: Security is enhanced by the consistent use of defusedxml for XML parsing to prevent standard XML vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 09:39 AM