docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/office/soffice.py, the skill performs runtime compilation of a C-based library and usesLD_PRELOADto inject it into thesofficeprocess. This shim intercepts system calls such assocket,listen, andacceptto enable functionality in environments where AF_UNIX sockets are restricted. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local binaries including
sofficefor document manipulation and conversion,gccfor compiling the environment shim,pandocfor text extraction, andpdftoppmfor rendering images. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted document data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
scripts/office/unpack.pyduring document extraction. Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using specific author markers (e.g., 'Claude') to delineate agent-generated content. Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (soffice.py,accept_changes.py) and extensive file system write access (pack.py). Sanitization: Security is enhanced by the consistent use ofdefusedxmlfor XML parsing to prevent standard XML vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata