skills/qiaoshouqing/skills/ship/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ship

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill performs multiple destructive and external-facing shell operations, including git add, git commit, git push, and gh pr create. It specifically instructs the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop safety checks with directives such as "Do NOT ask user for confirmation
  • auto-generate and proceed" and "No confirmation prompts
  • 'Ship' is the confirmation. Execute immediately."
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to instructions embedded in the data it processes.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads untrusted repository content via git diff --stat, git diff --cached, and git log in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested diff content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has write/execute capabilities via git push and gh pr create as seen in Steps 4 and 5 of SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the ingested diff content before it is processed by the LLM to generate commit messages and PR bodies.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (MEDIUM): The skill contains 'Override' style instructions that attempt to redefine the agent's safety constraints, specifically targeting the elimination of confirmation prompts for significant actions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 03:58 AM