The Agent Skills Directory

Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface by combining untrusted data ingestion with local file-writing capabilities.
Ingestion Points: Step 1 allows the agent to read content from user-specified local file paths or arbitrary pasted text (articles).
Boundary Markers: There are no specified delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat article content as data only, increasing the risk that the LLM obeys instructions embedded within a 'quote'.
Capability Inventory: Step 6 ('执行写入') explicitly requires the agent to 'physically write to files' using a Write tool.
Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted content is mentioned before it is written to the drive, allowing malicious payloads to be persisted.
Data Exposure & Path Traversal (MEDIUM): The skill hardcodes absolute Windows file paths (E:\OBData\ObsidianDatas...).
Evidence: Step 5 and Step 6 use specific local directories for indexing and storage. If an attacker-controlled article influences the 'Theme' (主题) used to generate the filename, it could lead to path traversal if not strictly validated by the underlying tool.
Safety Bypass Patterns (LOW): The skill's description and positioning include phrases like '无需审计流程' (No audit process needed).
Evidence: While intended to contrast with a 'knowledge_auditor' skill, this language can be interpreted by the LLM as a directive to skip safety checks or verification steps when processing potentially harmful content.

quote-extractor