spark

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local pre-compiled binaries (./spark/tools/memory and ./spark/tools/tavily-search) to perform database operations and network searches. Bundled binaries are opaque, meaning their internal behavior cannot be audited or verified, which poses a risk as they operate with the same privileges as the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to the Tavily search service to gather market research data. This involves sending user-related keywords to an external API and requires the user to provide a TAVILY_API_KEY in the environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes content from external search results without proper sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Step 4 parses JSON output from the tavily-search tool which contains content from arbitrary third-party websites.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not include delimiters or specific guidance to the agent to ignore any instructions found within the retrieved search data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the bundled binaries and maintain state in a local SQLite database (spark/memory.db).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or filtering for the external content before it is processed by the agent to generate ideas.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 24, 2026, 04:31 AM