blucli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata includes an installation step that fetches code from an unverified external source.
- Evidence: The
openclaw.installsection usesgo install github.com/steipete/blucli/cmd/blu@latest. This repository is not on the trusted vendors list, representing an unverifiable dependency from an unknown source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of a locally installed binary with various parameters.
- Evidence: The skill documentation instructs the agent to run the
blucommand with arguments such asdevices,play,pause, andvolume set, which translates to subprocess execution on the host machine. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection from data ingested during runtime.
- Ingestion points: Data entering the agent context via
blu devices(discovery of local network names) andblu tunein search(results from external radio APIs). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are present to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in device names or search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands and modify device states via the
blubinary. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the external output was found in the skill documentation.
Audit Metadata