ui-styling

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file references/canvas-design-system.md contains a behavioral override pattern: User already said: "It isn't perfect enough. Must be pristine... Apply this standard before delivery." This employs a simulated user quote to manipulate the agent's output style and priority, which is a classic injection technique used to bypass standard operating procedures.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow, as described in SKILL.md and implemented in scripts/shadcn_add.py, relies on executing npx shadcn@latest. This pattern downloads and executes code from the public npm registry at runtime without version pinning, creating a vector for executing untrusted or potentially malicious remote code if the package or registry is compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/shadcn_add.py uses subprocess.run to execute the npx command. It accepts a list of components as CLI arguments and appends them directly to the command list. This represents a command execution capability that could be exploited via flag injection if the agent populates the component list from untrusted user prompts.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: scripts/shadcn_add.py (via the components positional argument) and scripts/tailwind_config_gen.py (via multiple theme-related flags).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts do not use delimiters or warnings when processing these inputs.
  • Capability inventory: subprocess.run (in scripts/shadcn_add.py) and file-writing via Path.write_text (in scripts/tailwind_config_gen.py).
  • Sanitization: Absent. The scripts perform basic logic but do not sanitize inputs against argument injection or malicious string payloads before execution or file writing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 12:04 PM