workflow-weaver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It records the output of
WebFetch,WebSearch, andReadactions into a newSKILL.mdfile intended for future execution. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
WebFetch(URL content),WebSearch(search results), andRead(local file content) tool calls during the recording session. - Boundary markers: The skill template does not specify the use of strict delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the captured step descriptions or reference materials.
- Capability inventory: The resulting skill utilizes
bash,read, andwritetools. - Sanitization: The skill validates the
skill-namefor alphanumeric characters but does not sanitize the actual content captured from tool outputs before writing them to the final skill file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
bashtool to manage its directory structure (mkdir -p) and to generate the final skill file (cat > ...). It correctly validates theskill-namevariable to prevent command injection through directory names and uses a quoted heredoc (<< 'EOF') to prevent shell expansion of the recorded content. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the exposure of sensitive data by explicitly prompting the user to save the results of
ReadandWebFetchoperations into a localreferences/folder. This creates secondary copies of potentially sensitive information (e.g., configuration files, private documentation) in a predictable path within the.claude/skills/directory.
Audit Metadata