toon-formatter
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The skill relies on prebuilt binaries located in the
bin/directory (e.g.,toon-linux-x64). Executing prebuilt binaries is a high-risk activity as they are opaque and their behavior cannot be verified through static analysis of the source files provided. - [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The
docs/INSTALL.mdfile explicitly instructs users to execute commands with elevated privileges usingsudo(e.g.,sudo snap install zig,sudo mv zig-linux-x86_64-0.13.0 /usr/local/zig). This pattern is high-risk and violates the principle of least privilege for AI agent skills. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill requires the
Bashtool and defines several commands inSKILL.mdthat execute shell scripts and the compiledtoonbinary. This creates a significant attack surface if the environment is not strictly sandboxed. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill is designed to process and format arbitrary data from files, creating a surface for injection.
- Ingestion points: Commands like
/toon-encode <file>read external data files. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present in the conversion logic.
- Capability inventory: Access to
Bash,Read,Write, andEdittools allows for significant system interaction based on processed data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation before data is passed to the encoding binary or before the output is returned to the agent context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata