ralph

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The execution loop in ralph/ralph.sh invokes AI agents using flags (--dangerously-skip-permissions and --dangerously-allow-all) that explicitly disable safety prompts and permission checks. This allows the AI agent to autonomously execute generated code, including shell commands and file modifications, on the host system without human oversight.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's scripts (ralph/ralph.sh, ralph/ralph-tree.sh) perform several high-risk operations, such as creating and managing git worktrees and running package installation commands (bun install). These scripts also execute dynamically resolved bash scripts (ralph.sh) without verifying the integrity of the environment or the instructions generated from user-provided PRDs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted PRD text and converts it into a prd.json file, which then serves as the primary instruction set for the autonomous agent.
  • Ingestion points: PRD markdown text processed in SKILL.md and task definitions stored in prd.json.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; untrusted data is directly converted into task instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Full filesystem access, command execution, and network capabilities via the ralph.sh execution loop.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not implement validation or escaping for the user stories extracted from the PRD.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The notify function in ralph/ralph.sh sends development progress updates, including git branch names and user story titles, to the well-known notification service ntfy.sh. This provides external visibility into project status and internal task names.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 11:11 AM