sui-transaction-building
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill creates a significant attack surface by instructing the agent to process untrusted external data that can influence execution. 1. Ingestion points: The documentation describes loading transaction state via
Transaction.from(bytes)intransaction-serialization.mdand resolving dynamicIntentpayloads or usingfetchDynamicInput()inadvanced-features.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to distinguish between valid data and embedded malicious instructions within the transaction or intent structures. 3. Capability inventory: The skill leveragesclient.signAndExecuteTransactionfor execution,tx.moveCallfor contract interactions, andtx.publishfor module deployment. 4. Sanitization: Absent. While the skill mentions 'Sponsor Verification' as a concept, it lacks concrete sanitization patterns to prevent an agent from acting on malicious Move targets provided by a user or external source. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The skill introduces a plugin architecture and intent resolvers that allow logic modification at runtime. Evidence:
TransactionPluginandIntentresolver examples inadvanced-features.mdshow how the agent can define code to transform transaction data or resolve intents into Move calls, creating a pathway for logic injection. - External Downloads & Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill relies on external SDKs and codebases from MystenLabs. Evidence: References to the
@mysten/suipackage and GitHub source repositories are found inSKILL.mdandtransaction-serialization.md. These are external dependencies from an organization not included in the pre-approved trusted list.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata