creating-agent-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill interacts with the
~/.claude/.envfile to manage credentials and profile states. Although this is documented as a security feature to prevent leaking keys in chat logs, accessing sensitive environment files is a potential exposure vector. - Evidence:
references/api-security.mdinstructs the agent to grep and write to~/.claude/.env. - [Dynamic Execution] (LOW): Several workflows involve creating shell and Python scripts, modifying their permissions (
chmod +x), and executing them. This is the intended primary purpose of the skill but constitutes dynamic code generation and execution. - Evidence:
workflows/add-script.md(Step 6) andreferences/using-scripts.mddefine procedures for script creation and execution. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The audit and verification workflows ingest content from arbitrary skill files in the
~/.claude/skills/directory. Without sanitization or boundary markers, malicious instructions in these external files could influence the agent's behavior during the audit process. - Ingestion points:
workflows/audit-skill.md(Step 2: cat SKILL.md),workflows/verify-skill.md(Step 2: cat all files). - Boundary markers: Absent; the files are read directly into context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive file system and shell execution capabilities.
- Sanitization: Absent.
- [Unverifiable Dependencies] (LOW): The skill documentation recommends installing various third-party packages from PyPI and npm. While common, these represent an external dependency risk.
- Evidence:
references/official-spec.mdandreferences/executable-code.mdrecommendpip install pypdf pdfplumber.
Audit Metadata