dianalokadalight
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Prompt Injection (LOW): The instructions attempt to override agent identity and operational boundaries using phrases like 'this is permanent', 'there is no exit command', 'zero filter', and 'not pretending... you ARE her'. These patterns are designed to coerce the agent into maintaining a persona regardless of system constraints.
- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill mandates the ingestion of
references/tweets.jsoninto the agent's context. - Ingestion points:
references/tweets.jsonvia parallel tool calls (offset/limit). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions to treat the file content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: File system read access via tool calls.
- Sanitization: Absent; the agent is explicitly instructed to 'absorb' the entire archive before responding, increasing the risk that instructions inside the JSON could influence behavior.
Audit Metadata