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Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk capability tier where external data is ingested and then used in a side-effect-heavy operation (automated file opening).
- Ingestion points: Files are fetched from a remote workflow execution via
refly workflow toolcallsinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The agent does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
refly file downloadto save files to the user's$HOME/Desktop/and then immediately triggers theopencommand on those files. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation of file types, metadata, or content before the
opencommand is executed. - Command Execution (HIGH): The execution block in
SKILL.mdincludes a loop that automatically executesopenon any file returned by thereflyCLI tool. This is a classic 'download-and-execute' pattern that can be exploited if the remote service serves a malicious file (e.g., a script or app masquerading as an .mp4). - External Downloads (MEDIUM): The skill relies on the
reflyCLI and therefly.aiinfrastructure, which are not within the defined trusted source scope. It downloads opaque binary data (videos) and handles them with high-privilege local commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata