archive
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it instructs the agent to read and apply context from local files that could be manipulated by external actors.
- Ingestion points: Files located in
.archive/and the.archive/MEMORY.mdindex (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat archived content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write and
grepsubprocess execution (referenced inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize archived text before ingestion.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill guidelines suggest archiving 'secrets', 'IAM' details, and 'infrastructure' logs. Storing this information in plain-text files on the local disk increases the risk of sensitive data exposure if the local environment is compromised.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the agent's ability to execute shell commands, specifically
grep -ri, to perform searches within the archive directory.
Audit Metadata