rstack-bootstrap
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses bash and inline Python scripts to interact with web APIs, parse JSON responses, and modify system configuration files such as
.bashrc,.zshrc, andclaude_desktop_config.json. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill primarily communicates with the vendor's own domain (resolved.sh) and a partner service (agentmail.to), it writes sensitive information like API keys and session tokens to the
/tmp/directory (e.g.,/tmp/rstack_apikey.txt). On multi-user systems, files in/tmpare readable by other users, creating a risk of credential exposure. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto download and install additional tools from theresolved-sh/rstackandagentmail-to/agentmail-skillsGitHub repositories. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and parsing data from an external email inbox to extract verification tokens.
- Ingestion points: Reads email message bodies from
https://api.agentmail.to/v0/inboxes/$INBOX_ID/messages(SKILL.md Phase 2b). - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions are provided to the model to ignore other content within the email besides the expected token.
- Capability inventory: Uses
curlfor network requests andpython3for system writes and regex parsing. - Sanitization: Employs a regex
token=([A-Za-z0-9._\-]+)to restrict the characters extracted from the email body. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Implements persistence by modifying the system
crontaband shell profiles to schedule a maintenance script and export environment variables across sessions.
Audit Metadata