feishu-cli-read

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes Bash commands by directly interpolating user-supplied arguments such as <document_id>, <node_token>, and <url>. For example, feishu-cli doc export <document_id>. This creates a significant risk of command injection if a user provides input containing shell metacharacters like semicolons or pipes.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions specify accessing sensitive authentication materials, including environment variables (FEISHU_APP_ID, FEISHU_APP_SECRET) and local configuration files (~/.feishu-cli/token.json) that contain user and app access tokens.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external Feishu documents and images. 1. Ingestion points: Document text and assets exported to /tmp/feishu_doc.md and /tmp/feishu_assets/. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or protective instructions are used to distinguish external document content from the agent's system instructions. 3. Capability inventory: Access to the Bash tool for command execution and the Read tool for file access. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the document content before it is read by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers users to download the feishu-cli tool from the author's GitHub repository (riba2534/feishu-cli). This is documented as a neutral dependency reference for the vendor's own tool.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 11, 2026, 06:23 PM