feishu-cli-task
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its data processing workflow.
- Ingestion points: The
feishu-cli task listandfeishu-cli task getcommands (referenced in SKILL.md) ingest external, potentially attacker-controlled data from Feishu tasks. - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the task content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute commands that modify external state (create,update,delete,complete). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions from retrieved task data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on the
Bashtool to interface withfeishu-cli. While the scope is intended for task management, the lack of input validation on retrieved data could allow an attacker to influence the arguments passed to the CLI if the agent parses malicious task descriptions as instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata