looping-tasks

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The generated loop.sh script executes the claude CLI with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag.\n
  • Evidence: Found in SKILL.md within the bash script template: claude -p $SESSION_FLAG --model opus --dangerously-skip-permissions < "$PROMPT_FILE".\n
  • Impact: This flag bypasses manual confirmation for high-risk operations such as file modifications and shell command execution, allowing the agent to operate autonomously without a human-in-the-loop.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The generated script automatically performs a git push to the remote repository after completion or iteration.\n
  • Evidence: Found in SKILL.md: git push origin "$BRANCH" 2>/dev/null || git push -u origin "$BRANCH" 2>/dev/null.\n
  • Impact: In an autonomous loop, any data exfiltration or malicious code injection resulting from a prompt injection could be automatically synchronized to the remote origin before a user has a chance to review the changes.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it is designed to ingest and act upon data from project files.\n
  • Ingestion points: IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/handoff.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: The prompt instructs the agent to treat these files as "DATA" and disregard instructions within them.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has full file-system access and shell execution capabilities via the high-privilege claude CLI invocation.\n
  • Sanitization: None. The raw content of external files is provided directly to the agent.\n
  • Impact: Malicious instructions embedded in the implementation plan or other documentation could potentially bypass instructions and control the agent's behavior, leading to unauthorized actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 08:24 AM