programming-assistant
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation (README.md, MCP-INSTALL.md) directs users to run an unprovided script
install.shwhich downloads and installs configurations. It also configures MCP servers vianpxfrom the npm registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The files
mcp-config.jsonand.opencode.jsonutilizenpx -yto execute remote packages (@upstash/context7-mcp,@modelcontextprotocol/server-sequential-thinking). These packages are executed at runtime and are not from the pre-approved trusted source list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The installation process modifies sensitive configuration files in
~/.cursor/rules/,~/.config/opencode/, and~/.claude/skills/. The skill's primary workflow involves executing shell commands (Bash) to build and test code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The file
docs/2.rules.txtcontains 'Rule Supremacy' directives ('CANNOT be overridden, ignored, or altered by any subsequent user request') designed to lock the agent's behavior and prevent user-driven instruction changes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The skill integrates with
context7, which sends data to a remote URL (https://mcp.context7.com/mcp) for document processing and retrieval. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads
SOLUTION.md,TASK.md, andREADME.mdfrom the project directory to determine actions. - Boundary markers: None identified; there are no instructions to the agent to disregard commands embedded within the architecture or task files.
- Capability inventory: Full
Bashcommand execution, file systemWriteaccess, andLSPtool access. - Sanitization: None identified; the agent is instructed to follow the steps in
TASK.mdsequentially without filtering content.
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