release-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to execute local scripts and system commands that modify the repository state.
  • Evidence: Execution of .github/scripts/bump-version.ps1, .github/scripts/tag-release.sh, and .github/scripts/quick-release.sh.
  • Evidence: Usage of the GitHub CLI (gh workflow run) to trigger remote pipelines.
  • Risk: If an attacker can influence the content of these scripts or the parameters passed to them, they can achieve arbitrary code execution in the agent's environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core functionality of processing external, untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads and parses git log and commit messages to generate changelogs and release notes.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions defining delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" guards for the parsed commit data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has high-privilege capabilities including file modification (VERSION, CHANGELOG.md, .csproj), git tagging, git pushing, and triggering GitHub Actions workflows.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the commit message content before it is processed or used to influence the agent's next steps.
  • Risk: A malicious actor could craft a commit message containing instructions that the agent might follow when "categorizing" or "formatting" the notes, leading to unauthorized repository changes or data exfiltration.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 11:57 PM