spec-kitty-specify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input from the
$ARGUMENTSvariable to generate specification files (spec.md) and metadata. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where instructions embedded in a feature description could be persisted and later influence agents performing implementation or testing tasks. - Ingestion points: User input captured in
$ARGUMENTSand processed during the 'Discovery Gate' inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters or instructions to treat the interpolated user input as non-executable data.
- Capability inventory: The skill writes to the local file system (
spec.md,meta.json,checklists/requirements.md) and executes local CLI commands. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present to identify or neutralize prompt injection attempts within the user's description.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands and a vendor-specific CLI tool to manage project state.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinvokesgit branch --show-currentandspec-kitty agent feature create-feature "<slug>" --json. - Context: These operations are consistent with the skill's purpose of automating repository-based planning workflows.
Audit Metadata