skills/rjmurillo/ai-agents/github/Gen Agent Trust Hub

github

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Almost all scripts in the skill (e.g., scripts/pr/get_pr_context.py, scripts/issue/new_issue.py) use subprocess.run to execute GitHub CLI (gh) commands. Furthermore, scripts/test_workflow_locally.py is designed to invoke act and docker for local workflow testing, enabling the execution of code defined in potentially untrusted local or remote workflow files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its processing of external, untrusted content.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple scripts, including scripts/pr/get_pr_review_comments.py, scripts/issue/invoke_copilot_assignment.py, and scripts/pr/invoke_pr_comment_processing.py, retrieve and parse comments from GitHub PRs and issues which are authored by external users.
  • Boundary markers: The skill employs markers such as <!-- COPILOT-CONTEXT-SYNTHESIS --> in scripts/issue/invoke_copilot_assignment.py and other user-provided HTML comment markers in scripts/issue/post_issue_comment.py for idempotency, but these markers do not inherently sanitize or prevent the model from interpreting instructions within the ingested comment text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities that could be targeted by an injection attack, such as merging pull requests (scripts/pr/merge_pr.py), creating new issues (scripts/issue/new_issue.py), and modifying repository settings like auto-merge (scripts/pr/set_pr_auto_merge.py).
  • Sanitization: While the scripts generally use safe execution patterns (passing arguments as lists to subprocess.run), there is no significant sanitization or filtering of the natural language content extracted from comments before it is used to drive automated logic or synthesized for other AI tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 02:42 AM