Unifi

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The skill requires users to store UniFi controller credentials, including username and password, in a plaintext file (config.json).
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and config.example.json instruct the user to provide and save real credentials in the local skill directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection risk (Category 8). The skill ingests untrusted data from the network environment which can influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: clients (hostnames), alerts (log messages/events), and devices (device names) commands in unifi-cli.ts.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to sanitize or ignore embedded instructions in the network data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has shell execution capabilities via bun and network access via the controller API.
  • Sanitization: None documented; the agent parses and presents results directly to the user/context.
  • Risk: An attacker on the network could change a device's hostname to a malicious prompt injection payload, which the agent would then process and potentially obey.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill provides the agent with a list of CLI commands to execute on the host system using the bun runtime.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md provides explicit bun ~/.claude/skills/Unifi/unifi-cli.ts <command> templates.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill downloads external dependencies during setup.
  • Evidence: package.json requires node-unifi from the npm registry. While node-unifi is a standard community package, it is an external dependency that executes during runtime.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 02:09 AM