k8s-incident

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill creates a high-risk attack surface by consuming untrusted data from the Kubernetes cluster while possessing administrative capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The tools get_pod_logs, get_events, and describe_pod (referenced in SKILL.md) ingest free-text data from the cluster environment.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters mentioned to separate untrusted data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes high-privilege tools such as delete_pod (with force=True), rollback_deployment, and rollback_helm_release (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of log/event content before processing.
  • Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The skill explicitly provides tools for destructive and state-altering operations in a production environment.
  • Evidence: delete_pod(name, namespace, grace_period=0, force=True) in SKILL.md provides direct capability for resource destruction.
  • Evidence: rollback_deployment and rollback_helm_release allow the agent to modify the cluster's desired state without additional confirmation layers.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:46 AM