motion-graphics
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides implementation patterns that utilize system-level command execution to handle media processing.
- Evidence:
rules/audio-sync.mdandrules/web-export.mdcontain Python and JavaScript snippets that usesubprocess.runandexecSyncto callffmpegfor video muxing and encoding. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of interactive debugging features which open an embedded shell within the execution environment.
- Evidence:
rules/community-edition-patterns.mdandrules/opengl-renderer-patterns.mddocument the use ofinteractive_embed()andembed(), allowing for real-time code execution and object inspection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted text data for video and audio generation.
- Ingestion points:
rules/audio-sync.mddefines workflows where user-supplied script text is passed to Text-to-Speech (TTS) engines and Manim text objects. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands were found in the templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to subprocess execution (
ffmpeg), file system writes/deletes, and interactive Python shells. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of input script content is implemented.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external libraries and well-known service providers for media enhancement.
- Evidence:
rules/audio-sync.mdlists integrations with well-known TTS services including OpenAI, Azure, and ElevenLabs. It also references theedge-ttsandpydubPython packages.
Audit Metadata