agent-arch-system-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill defines local shell commands in its
pre_executionandpost_executionhooks (find,grep,head). While the specified commands are common utility tools, the use of hooks to execute arbitrary shell code contradicts the skill's ownrestricted_toolsconfiguration which blocks theBashtool, representing a bypass of intended security constraints. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted external data and possesses write capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses the
Readtool to ingest content from*.mdfiles and usesWebSearchto retrieve information from the internet (SKILL.md, capabilities section). - Boundary markers: There are no delimited boundaries or instructions provided to the agent to ignore or isolate embedded instructions within the ingested markdown files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the
Writetool enabled fordocs/anddiagrams/directories, allowing it to modify project documentation based on potentially malicious instructions found in processed files. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined to filter malicious payloads from ingested data before they influence the agent's output or documentation writes.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata