agent-v3-queen-coordinator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill's
pre_executionandpost_executionhooks usenpx agentic-flow@alpha. This downloads a package from the npm registry at runtime. Sinceagentic-flowis not a verified trusted source and the skill specifies the@alphatag, the executed code is unverifiable and could change at any time. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill executes various shell commands including
jq,cat, and the GitHub CLI (gh). This is used for local data processing and environment checks. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface (Category 8). The skill is designed for 'GitHub issue management,' which requires processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Content from GitHub issues.
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are used in the shell scripts to isolate external content.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
npxandgh, and temporary file writes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from GitHub before it is processed by the agent.
- DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The
post_executionhook sends session metadata (task name, agent ID, and status) to theagentic-flowcommand. While this appears to be for telemetry or state management, it involves transferring internal agent context to an external package.
Audit Metadata