skills/ruvnet/ruflo/agent-planner/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-planner

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input through the $TASK variable which is incorporated into the planning logic and execution hooks.
  • Ingestion points: $TASK variable used in the 'pre' and 'post' hooks within the YAML frontmatter of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the task input.
  • Capability inventory: Access to 'memory_store' for state persistence and several 'mcp__claude-flow' tools for task orchestration and resource allocation.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the input is interpolated directly into commands and processed by the planning logic without validation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The YAML hooks execute shell-like commands that interpolate the $TASK variable directly.
  • Evidence: Hooks in SKILL.md use echo "... $TASK" and memory_store "... $TASK".
  • Risk: If the host environment executing these hooks does not properly escape the $TASK string, it could allow for command injection (e.g., via backticks or subshell expansion) by a user providing a malicious task description.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 04:32 PM