ultrathink-orchestrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by interpreting natural language user requests to determine which execution path to take.
  • Ingestion points: User requests containing keywords such as 'implement', 'fix', or 'investigate' are used to categorize tasks in Step 2 (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions defined to isolate the user-provided data from the orchestration logic, potentially allowing crafted input to influence the workflow selection.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Read tool to access local filesystem content and the Skill tool to invoke other functional skills based on the classification result.
  • Sanitization: No explicit validation or sanitization of user input is documented before the classification step.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads orchestration instructions and workflow steps from external local files.
  • Evidence: The skill is designed as a 'thin wrapper' that fetches its primary logic from ~/.amplihack/.claude/commands/amplihack/ultrathink.md and subsequent workflow steps from other markdown files in the ~/.amplihack/ directory. While these are vendor-specific resources for the 'amplihack' toolset, this pattern means the agent's behavior is governed by files external to the skill's own definition.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 03:25 PM