ultrathink-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by interpreting natural language user requests to determine which execution path to take.
- Ingestion points: User requests containing keywords such as 'implement', 'fix', or 'investigate' are used to categorize tasks in Step 2 (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions defined to isolate the user-provided data from the orchestration logic, potentially allowing crafted input to influence the workflow selection.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Readtool to access local filesystem content and theSkilltool to invoke other functional skills based on the classification result. - Sanitization: No explicit validation or sanitization of user input is documented before the classification step.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads orchestration instructions and workflow steps from external local files.
- Evidence: The skill is designed as a 'thin wrapper' that fetches its primary logic from
~/.amplihack/.claude/commands/amplihack/ultrathink.mdand subsequent workflow steps from other markdown files in the~/.amplihack/directory. While these are vendor-specific resources for the 'amplihack' toolset, this pattern means the agent's behavior is governed by files external to the skill's own definition.
Audit Metadata