fix-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) because it processes potentially untrusted CI log data to determine its next actions.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches failed logs from GitHub Actions using
gh run view --log-failedas described in Step 1 ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded within the fetched logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive permissions, including the ability to modify local source code, execute tests via
pytest, and push code to remote branches usinggit push. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the log content before the agent analyzes it to determine which 'targeted fixes' to apply.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of several local CLI tools to perform its intended functions.
- Evidence: It uses
gitfor branch management and committing,ghfor interacting with GitHub Actions, andruff,mypy, andpytestfor code correction and verification. - Context: These tools are well-known and standard for the described purpose; however, their execution is triggered by logic that evaluates external, untrusted log data.
Audit Metadata