pr-guardian
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script
scripts/poll_pr_status.shto retrieve the current state of a GitHub Pull Request. This script uses theghCLI to interact with the GitHub API. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its automated processing of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/poll_pr_status.shscript ingests CI check names and PR comment bodies (specifically targeting CodeRabbit bot comments) usinggh pr checksandgh apirespectively. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate the ingested external text from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, as it is designed to autonomously invoke other skills like
/fix-ciand/fix-reviewwhich modify the codebase and push changes back to the repository. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub comments or CI check results before they influence the agent's decision-making loop.
- [AUTONOMOUS_BEHAVIOR]: The skill is designed to operate with high autonomy, looping until CI passes and proactively triggering itself via
PostToolUsehooks without direct user confirmation for each iteration.
Audit Metadata