web3-forge
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk attack surface as it is designed to ingest and process external, untrusted smart contract code and directory structures.
- Ingestion points: Processes Solidity files in
tests/andscripts/and readspackage.jsonfor dependency versioning. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to delimit user code or ignore instructions embedded in code comments (e.g., malicious NatSpec).
- Capability inventory: Possesses execution capabilities via
forge test,forge script, andforge coverage, which include network broadcasting and local shell access. - Sanitization: Absent. No validation or sanitization of ingested code content before processing.
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the agent to suggest or perform installation of third-party tools that are not from the defined trusted organizations.
- Evidence:
pip install halmosandpip install certora-clifound inreferences/formal-verification.md. - Evidence: Instructs the agent to dynamically fetch and read
Vm.solfromhttps://github.com/foundry-rs/forge-std(an untrusted organization per the [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE]). - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill provides patterns for executing
forge scriptwith the--broadcastand--verifyflags, which perform network-based write operations (blockchain transactions) and send data to Etherscan. - Credential Management (LOW): The skill correctly uses placeholders for sensitive environment variables like
ETH_FROM,MNEMONIC, andPRIVATE_KEY. While not a finding of hardcoded secrets, these instructions define the context for handling high-value assets that increase the impact of any potential exfiltration or injection attack.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata