debug

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill invokes several local scripts, including ./scripts/log-skill.sh and ./scripts/push-env.sh. The execution of unverified local scripts allows for arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION / CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The workflow explicitly references ./scripts/push-env.sh for 'Syncing environment variables'. Environment variables frequently contain sensitive API keys, tokens, and database credentials. Without verification of the script's destination, this represents a high risk of credential theft or data exfiltration.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via 'Logs / Errors' in templates/bug-report.template.md and external error messages processed in workflows/reproduce-issue.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions to ignore embedded commands within logs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute ./scripts/push-env.sh, npm run test, and create new scripts in scripts/repro/.
  • Sanitization: None. The agent is encouraged to directly use logs and error messages to drive its debugging behavior, which could be exploited by an attacker-controlled error message to trigger unintended tool calls.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The workflows/reproduce-issue.md file instructs the agent to create and run new scripts in scripts/repro/. This pattern of dynamic code generation and execution is a common vector for exploitation if the logic used to generate the script is influenced by malicious external input (e.g., a crafted bug report).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:05 PM