internal-comms

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and summarize data from potentially attacker-controlled sources, creating a significant vulnerability surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: The files examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, and examples/faq-answers.md instruct the agent to read Slack messages, Google Drive documents, Emails, and Calendar events. It also specifically suggests looking for external press in examples/company-newsletter.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the retrieved content, making it impossible for the agent to distinguish between data and malicious commands.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent produces high-impact outputs such as company-wide newsletters, leadership updates, and internal FAQs. If the agent automatically posts these (as suggested by the instruction 'It will be sent via Slack and email') or if a user trusts the summary, malicious content could be distributed to the entire organization.\n
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any sanitization or validation of the external content. It specifically looks for high-engagement items (messages with many reactions or responses), which are primary targets for attackers seeking to influence the agent's output.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 11:59 PM