chrome-devtools
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The
scripts/install-deps.shscript requires and utilizessudo(root privileges) to install system-level dependencies for Chromium on Linux/WSL. While this is standard for Puppeteer environments, it represents a high-privilege operation. - [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/evaluate.jsscript provides a wrapper forpage.evaluate(), which directly executes strings viaeval()inside the browser context. This is the primary purpose of the script but creates a high-risk primitive if the input is influenced by untrusted external data. - [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): Several scripts (
screenshot.js,network.js,performance.js) accept an--outputargument that specifies a file path for writing data. There is no path validation or sandboxing, allowing the agent to potentially write files to any location accessible by the user session. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): This skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from the web (DOM snapshots, console logs, network traffic).
- Ingestion points:
snapshot.js(DOM content),console.js(logs),network.js(traffic),evaluate.js(script results). - Boundary markers: None. Data is returned as raw JSON to the agent.
- Capability inventory: File writing (
screenshot.js), form interaction (fill.js), and arbitrary script execution in-browser (evaluate.js). - Sanitization:
scripts/lib/selector.jsimplements basic XPath injection prevention patterns to block common JavaScript triggers in selectors. - [External Downloads] (LOW): The
scripts/install.shandpackage.jsontrigger the download of the Chromium binary from Google's servers during thenpm installphase.
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