feishu-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its chat monitoring features.
- Ingestion points: In
references/monitor-chat.md, the skill reads chat content usingbrowser action=snapshotto extract DOM text andbrowser action=screenshotfor analysis by an image tool. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or explicit guidance for the agent to treat ingested chat text as untrusted data, increasing the risk of the agent obeying instructions embedded in messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including sending messages (
references/send-message.md), @mentioning users, creating documents (references/create-doc.md), and modifying document permissions (references/doc-permissions.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter or escape the content of ingested messages before they are processed by the agent's logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on
browser action=actwith theevaluatemethod to execute JavaScript snippets within the browser's context. While these scripts are used for UI automation (e.g., clicking buttons, inserting text viaexecCommand), they represent a mechanism for executing code within an authenticated web session.
Audit Metadata