x-api-reader
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses and manages a sensitive file path at
~/.config/x-api/.envto store and load an X API Bearer Token. Accessing environment files or local credential stores is considered a high-risk behavior as these paths are frequent targets for data theft. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several shell commands including
curl,source,mkdir,chmod, andreadto perform setup and API operations. Thesourcecommand is used to load variables into the shell environment, which could execute arbitrary code if the configuration file is modified by a malicious process or user. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a significant indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from the X API.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via X API v2 endpoints such as
/2/tweetsand/2/search/recent, which contain arbitrary user-generated content. - Boundary markers: The command templates do not use delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to disregard commands potentially hidden within the fetched tweet text.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to write to the file system (
echo) and is explicitly instructed to 'update this SKILL.md' with new patterns or techniques it discovers. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions or hidden characters from the fetched API responses before they are processed by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits the
X_BEARER_TOKENin HTTP headers toapi.x.com. While this targets a well-known service, the local storage and manual handling of raw tokens increase the risk of credential exposure.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata