langgraph-agents

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The MCP integration reference (reference/mcp-integration.md) provides examples of using npx -y to download and execute tool servers from the @anthropic organization. Per the [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], because Anthropic is a trusted organization, this remote download pattern is classified as LOW.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The 'Deep Agents' framework documentation (reference/deep-agents.md) lists an execute_command tool as a built-in capability. While described as 'sandboxed', this functionality allows agents to run shell commands, which is a high-privilege operation associated with the skill's intended purpose for technical automation.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (LOW): The Model Context Protocol (MCP) integration (reference/mcp-integration.md) allows agents to dynamically load and execute tools from remote servers or local processes (stdio). This provides a flexible but broad execution surface.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is designed to build agents that ingest untrusted data, creating an Indirect Prompt Injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: web_search output, read_file content, and external MCP tool responses (e.g., GitHub, Postgres).
  • Boundary markers: The skill includes robust mitigation patterns, such as declarative interrupts (interrupt_on) for human-in-the-loop approvals and FilesystemMiddleware for path/extension whitelisting.
  • Capability inventory: Agents have access to execute_command, write_file, and skill_invoke tools across multiple files.
  • Sanitization: The documentation relies on architectural constraints and human review rather than explicit input sanitization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:48 PM