meeting-intelligence-system-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of meeting transcripts and notes, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the input could influence the agent's behavior during analysis or email generation.\n
- Ingestion points: User-provided meeting transcripts, notes, and recording summaries ingested via the workflow in SKILL.md.\n
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the source text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill includes instructions to write execution telemetry to the local filesystem at
~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-meeting-intelligence-system.json.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation, filtering, or escaping of the input content before processing.
Audit Metadata