add-bot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Command Execution] (HIGH): The skill executes several GitHub CLI (
gh) commands that perform state-changing operations on repositories and the local environment. Specifically, it usesgh apito modify repository collaborator permissions. - [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The primary function of the skill is to grant
pushpermissions to a third-party account (seabbs-bot). This represents a persistent privilege escalation vector; if an agent is tricked into running this on a sensitive repository, an external entity gains write access to the codebase. - [Identity Manipulation] (HIGH): The skill uses
gh auth switchto change the active GitHub user. This is a dangerous pattern for AI skills as it manipulates the security context of the host environment. If the execution fails before the final step, the environment remains logged into a different account, leading to unauthorized actions or identity confusion. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): Mandatory Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: The
repoargument is parsed from user input or environment context. - Boundary markers: None. The repository name is interpolated directly into API paths.
- Capability inventory:
gh api ... -X PUT(File modification/Write access via Git). - Sanitization: None detected. An attacker providing a malicious repository string or influencing the agent to target a specific repository can achieve unauthorized persistent access for their bot.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata