add-bot
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes series of
ghCLI commands to perform administrative tasks. It usesgh auth switchto change the local authentication context andgh apiwith thePUTmethod to modify repository collaborator permissions. This behavior leverages the existing privileges of the user running the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the data it processes.
- Ingestion points: Configuration is read from the
## Automation configtable withinCLAUDE.mdin the project directory. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or validation steps are present to ensure the
CLAUDE.mdfile has not been tampered with. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to grant repository write access ('push' permissions) and switch between authenticated GitHub sessions via
gh auth switch. - Sanitization: There is no logic to verify that the
bot_accountorowner_accountstrings retrieved from the file are legitimate or expected before the agent proceeds to grant permissions.
Audit Metadata