org-orchestrate
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Establishes system persistence and scheduled background execution.
- Evidence: Modifies the user's
crontaband creates/loads macOSlaunchdplist files in~/Library/LaunchAgents/to run automation scripts periodically. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Encourages the bypass of built-in security controls.
- Evidence: Explicitly prompts the user to consider using the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag for unattended runs, which removes human-in-the-loop approval for sensitive operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs dynamic script generation and runtime execution.
- Evidence: Generates, verifies, and executes helper scripts within
~/.claude/scripts/and creates project-specificTaskfile.ymlconfigurations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches external code from GitHub.
- Evidence: Uses the
gh repo clonecommand to download entire repositories from specified organizations to the local filesystem. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains instructions to override default agent behavior.
- Evidence: Includes a directive to "automatically exit" after completing phases if run as a standalone request.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential for indirect prompt injection via external data.
- Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.mdfiles from potentially untrusted cloned repositories. - Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: Can write files, modify cron/launchd, and execute arbitrary shell commands via generated scripts.
- Sanitization: None identified for the content read from
CLAUDE.mdbefore processing logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata