second-brain
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from various locations within a user's Obsidian vault and uses that data to drive core logic (Inbox Processing and Daily Planning). Combined with its file-modification capabilities, this creates a high-severity vulnerability surface. Ingestion points: All files within the user-specified vault directory, specifically
00-Inbox/,01-Projects/, and02-Areas/. Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to parse and obey structural elements (tags, headers) directly from the text of the notes. Capability inventory: FullRead,Write,Edit,Glob, andGrepaccess across the vault structure. Sanitization: None; the skill lacks any mechanisms to sanitize or escape content before it is processed by the agent. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes agent tools like
GlobandGrepon file paths provided by the user. A manipulated vault path stored in Memory or environment variables could lead to directory traversal or exposure of files outside the intended vault scope. - Persistence Mechanisms (LOW): The configuration guide in
config/README.mdrecommends that users add environment variables to their shell profiles (e.g.,~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc) to persist the vault path configuration, which is a common but persistent system modification.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata