using-git-worktrees

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill automatically executes package installation and test commands based on files detected in the repository.
  • Evidence: The 'Run Project Setup' and 'Verify Clean Baseline' sections in SKILL.md invoke npm install, pip install -r requirements.txt, poetry install, cargo build, npm test, cargo test, pytest, and go test without a human-in-the-loop confirmation.
  • Risk: An attacker can include malicious preinstall or postinstall scripts in package.json, or embed malicious code within the test suite that executes when the agent attempts to verify the 'clean' baseline.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill performs shell-level directory creation and navigation based on variables derived from the repository environment.
  • Evidence: git worktree add "$path" -b "$BRANCH_NAME" and subsequent cd "$path" commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill initiates downloads of external dependencies from public registries.
  • Evidence: Execution of npm install, pip install, and go mod download triggers network requests to external package repositories.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The skill parses CLAUDE.md for instructional preferences, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Evidence: grep -i "worktree.*director" CLAUDE.md is used to determine directory selection logic from an untrusted repository file.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:01 AM